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I. INTRODUCTION
This survey collects and discusses Florida admiralty cases that
were reported between October 1, 1990, and June 30, 1991.1 Although
* Professor of Law, Nova University Shepard Broad Law Center. B.A., North-
western University; J.D., University of Pennsylvania; LL.M., New York University. An
early draft of this survey was presented in Orlando to the Admiralty Law Committee
of The Florida Bar during the Bar's 1991 Annual Meeting. The author received many
helpful comments from the members in attendance, and hereby expresses his
appreciation.
1. Not included in this survey are cases that touch only incidentally on admiralty
law. See, e.g., Belcher Oil Co. v. Florida Fuels, Inc., 749 F. Supp. 1104, 1991 AMC
911 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (South Florida fuel supplier that enjoyed dominant market posi-
tion would not be heard to say that it had suffered an anti-trust injury when various
cruise ship operators attempted to create competition by encouraging the formation of
a rival fuel supplier); Carner-Mason Assocs. v. Heller Fin., Inc., 581 So. 2d 1324 (Fla.
3d Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (foreclosure judgment was properly entered in favor of plain-
tiff who lent money to defendant so that it could build a marina on Miami Beach);
Stewart v. Stewart, 581 So. 2d 246 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (judgment ordering
defendants to turn over their marina to the plaintiffs pursuant to a lease and option
agreement reversed upon defendants' showing that they had terminated properly the
1
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the survey period generated only a handful of decisions, the ones that it
did produce were among the most unique issued in recent years.
Three opinions, each concerning the professional responsibility of
admiralty lawyers, were particularly noteworthy. The first two dealt
with the reprimanding of individual attorneys, while the third changed
the manner in which those who practice admiralty law may advertise
their services.
In The Florida Bar v. Herrick,' Peter S. Herrick, a seasoned ad-
miralty practitioner,3 received a public reprimand from the Florida Su-
preme Court for attempting to solicit business. Herrick had learned
that the United States Customs Service had taken possession of a ves-
sel4 and was planning to forfeit it unless a claim and bond for $2,500
were posted by the owners by August 15, 1985. 5 He therefore sent to a
couple who had an interest in the boat an unsolicited letter that said in
pertinent part: "Our law firm specializes in Customs laws relating to
vessel seizures. If you have any questions, please call."' ,
Herrick's actions were reported to The Florida Bar. After an in-
vestigation, a Bar referee recommended that Herrick be publicly repri-
manded.' In the view of the referee, Herrick had committed three vio-
lations of the Code of Professional Responsibility. 8 First, his unsolicited
lease and extinguished the option); Shofner v. Giles, 579 So. 2d 861 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1991) (new trial on damages ordered in yacht buyer's fraud suit due to inconsis-
tencies in the jury's verdict form); City of Miami Beach v. Carner, 579 So. 2d 248
(Fla. 3d Dist Ct. App. 1991) (new trial ordered to determine whether City of Miami
Beach and the Miami Beach Redevelopment Authority had violated the terms of a
thirty year lease under which the plaintiffs were to build and operate a marina on city
property); Sheridan v. Deep Lagoon Marina, 576 So. 2d 771 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1991) (property owners who lived near site of proposed marina expansion project could
challenge state's finding that the project complied with the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act); Black v. Marine Engineering Specialists, 574 So. 2d 283 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 1991) (engineer who had installed air conditioner and generator on yacht
failed to prove that seller of yacht had been acting as the apparent agent of the buyer
of the yacht).
2. 571 So. 2d 1303 (Fla. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2798 (1991).
3. Herrick received a B.S. from the United States Merchant Marine Academy in
1961 and a J.D. from Georgetown University in 1967. He was admitted to practice in
the District of Columbia in 1968 and in Florida in 1977.
4. The seized vessel was a thirty foot long 1981 Formula Thunderbird racing
boat. Id. at 1304.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 1304-05.
8. Because Herrick's letter had been sent in 1985, his conduct was judged by the
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letter did not contain a disclaimer indicting that it was an advertise-
ment.9 Second, Herrick's letter stated that he was a specialist in cus-
toms law, thereby representing that he had competence in a particular
area of law. 10 Third, Herrick's letter claimed that he specialized in an
area of law that had not been recognized by either the Florida Certifi-
cation Plan or the Florida Designation Plan. 1
Upon learning of the referee's recommendation, Herrick appealed
to the Florida Supreme Court." The court, however, in a per curiam
opinion,"t rejected the appeal and entered an order publicly reprimand-
ing Herrick and requiring him to pay the costs of the proceeding. 4
In its relatively lengthy opinion, the court first found that the re-
quirement that all unsolicited letters from attorneys be stamped "Ad-
vertisement" was reasonable and did not violate any of Herrick's con-
stitutional rights.' 5 The court then turned to the question of whether
Herrick had held himself out as a specialist. 6 According to Herrick, he
had not claimed to be a specialist, but had merely indicated that he
specialized in a particular area of law.' As such, Herrick believed that
now superseded Code of Professional Responsibility. Herrick, 571 So. 2d at 1304 n.1.
9. Id. at 1305.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 1304.
13. By tradition, the court always issues per curiam opinions in attorney disci-
pline cases.
14. Herrick, 571 So. 2d at 1307.
15. Herrick had claimed that the requirement violated his first amendment
rights. Id. at 1305. The court, however, disagreed. Relying on Shapero v. Kentucky
Bar Association, 486 U.S. 466 (1988), it explained:
[W)e believe that . . . [the rule] . . . is constitutional as one of these "less
restrictive and more precise means" of regulation envisioned by the Su-
preme Court. The use of the term "Advertisement" printed on the letter
acts to disclose the nature of the letter to the recipient. Its purpose is to
assuage any concerns the recipient may have due to receiving a personal-
ized letter from an attorney.
Herrick, 571 So. 2d at 1305-06.
16. Because it found that the charges against Herrick under count three were
subsumed by those contained in count two, the court elected to treat the two together.
Id. at 1307.
17. Herrick's argument rested on a dictionary definition of the word "specialize."
In the dictionary relied on by Herrick, WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGE DICTIONARY (1974),
the word "specialize" was defined as meaning "to concentrate one's efforts in a special
activity or field." Id. at 1306. Thus, Herrick sought to argue that when he claimed he
specialized in customs law, he really was saying only that his practice concentrated on
1991]
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he had not violated any ethical prohibition. The court, however, was
not impressed with the tendered distinction. In finding that the refe-
ree's conclusion had been sound, the court wrote:
By prohibiting the general use of the term "specialist," the rule
seeks to restrain advertising which can be false, deceptive, or mis-
leading. By characterizing himself as a specialist, an attorney does
more than merely indicate that he practices within a particular
field. The term "specialist" carries with it the implication that the
attorney has special competence and expertise in an area of law.
We reject Herrick's argument that the word "specialize" carries a
different connotation than "specialist." 18
Peter Herrick was not the only experienced admiralty attorney to
run afoul of the Bar's ethical rules during the survey period. In The
Florida Bar v. Huggett,19 William T. Huggett, a twenty year veteran
of the admiralty bar,20 continued his fight with the Bar over his deal-
ings with two injured seamen.
On December 7, 1989, the Bar had instituted disciplinary proceed-
ings against Huggett by filing a four count complaint.2 1 counts one and
two related to Huggett's solicitation in 1988 of a seaman who had been
injured as a result of an accident involving petrochemical fumes. When
the seaman died, Huggett, through his investigator, continued his at-
tempt to be retained by soliciting the seaman's widow. 2 Counts three
and four grew out of Huggett's representation of Jonathan Chacon, a
seaman who had been injured aboard a cargo vessel in February, 1982.
While representing Chacon, Huggett allegedly advanced funds to
Chacon for living expenses and paid six witnesses for their testimony
contingent upon the outcome of the case.28
such cases. Id.
18. Id. at 1307.
19. 16 Fla. L. Weekly 551 (1991).
20. Huggett received his A.B. from Emory University in 1962 and his J.D. from
the University of Florida in 1965. He was admitted to practice in Florida in 1966.
21. Id. at S51.
22. Id.
23. Id. Although the jury found for Chacon, the judgment was reversed due to
the prejudicial actions and statements of Huggett during the course of the trial. See
Del Monte Banana Co. v. Chacon, 466 So. 2d 1167 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
After the case was remanded for a second trial, the trial court ultimately dismissed the
suit with prejudice because of Chacon's repeated failure to make himself available for
depositions. Huggett then instituted suit in federal court. That suit was found to be
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In February, 1990, the Bar served Huggett with a set of interroga-
tories and a document production request.2' When Huggett refused to
comply fully with the Bar's demands, the Bar filed a motion to compel
discovery.25 In May, 1990, a Bar referee entered an order granting the
Bar's motion.26 When Huggett failed to heed the order, the Bar in
June, 1990 obtained a judgment of contempt that included a recom-
mendation that Huggett be suspended from the practice of law for ten
days and until such time as he had fully complied with the discovery
order.27 Upon receiving the referee's decision, Huggett petitioned the
Florida Supreme Court for a review of the judgment while the Bar
moved for approval and enforcement of the suggested sanction .2
Before the court, Huggett made the same arguments that he had
made before the referee. He contended that the discovery requests were
improper because the information sought by the Bar was protected by
the fifth amendment's privilege against self-incrimination, the attorney-
client privilege, and the work product rule.29 To buttress his position,
Huggett submitted an affidavit from Adela Molian De Chacon,
Jonathan Chacon's widow, that asserted that she would be put in great
jeopardy if the ultimate outcome of her husband's suit were to become
known in his native Guatemala.30
After a careful and detailed review, the court agreed to an extent
with Huggett. Although it found that most of the Bar's discovery re-
quests were proper, it held that Huggett had a good faith basis for
arguing that three of the Bar's interrogatories were likely to lead to
evidence that Huggett had engaged in the illegal solicitation of legal
time-barred, however, and was dismissed despite Huggett's argument that the state suit
had tolled the running of the statute of limitations. See Chacon-Gordon v. M/V Euge-
nio "C", 1987 AMC 1886 (S.D. Fla. 1987). A short time later, the dismissal of
Chacon's state suit was affirmed. See Costa Line, Inc. v. Chacon-Gordon, 530 So. 2d
312 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
24. Huggett, 16 Fla. L. Weekly at 552.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at S51.
29. Huggett, 16 Fla. L. Weekly at S52.
30. Id. Although each of the suits instituted by Chacon had been thrown out one
by one, see supra note 23, a partial settlement had been reached in 1986 while Chacon
was still alive. According to his widow, it had been agreed at the time of the settlement
that the terms would remain confidential "to protect the Chacons against extortion,
theft and kidnapping, which . . . are common in Guatemala when it is learned that a
person has acquired wealth." Huggett, 16 Fla. L. Weekly at S52.
1991]
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business. 31 Since such solicitation, if proved, would constitute a first
degree misdemeanor,8 2 the court reversed the order of contempt.3 3 In-
stead, it directed Huggett to comply with all aspects of the referee's
discovery order, except for the three improper interrogatories, within
twenty days.3 The court further directed that if Huggett failed to do
so within the stated twenty day period, he would be suspended from
practice for ten days and continuously thereafter until he complied."
The final case of the survey period involving attorney ethics was
The Florida Bar: Petition to Amend The Rules Regulating The Flor-
ida Bar-Advertising Issues."6 The case grew out of a petition filed by
the Bar that asked the Florida Supreme court to make a number of
changes in the rules governing lawyer advertising. Following a
lengthy review period and the receipt of numerous public comments,
the court, in an opinion written by Justice Overton and dissented from
in part by Chief Justice Shaw and Justices Barkett and Kogan, granted
the petition with certain modifications.3 8 As modified, the new rules
went into effect on April 1, 1991.11
Because the Bar's petition recommended drastic changes in how
attorneys may advertise on the radio and television,"' almost no atten-
31. Id. at S53. The three interrogatories were numbered 20, 24, and 25g. Inter-
rogatories 20 and 25g asked Huggett about his retention of an investigator and the
matters assigned to the investigator. Interrogatory 24 asked Huggett to "list any sea-
man, religious or benevolence organization" in which he had been involved since 1988
and to identify the specific nature of his involvement. Id,
32. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. §§ 877.02(1), 775.15(2)(c) (1987)).
33. Id.
34. Huggett, 16 Fla. L. Weekly at S53.
35. Id. In an ironic twist, a short time after the supreme court's decision Huggett
received The Florida Bar President's Pro Bono Service Award for his work with indi-
gent seamen. See Pro Bono Awards, FLA. B. NEWS, Apr. 1, 1991, at 23, col. 1.
36. 571 So. 2d 451 (Fla. 1990).
37. Id. at 452.
38. Id.
39. The changes originally were scheduled to go into effect on January 1, 1991.
This date was extended, however, when it was pointed out that many lawyers, as well
as the Bar itself, would find it difficult to comply so quickly. See Mark D. Killian,
Court Adopts Bar Ad Restrictions, FLA. B. NEWS, Jan. 15, 1991, at 1, col. 1. On April
2, 1991, a lawsuit was filed in federal court in Tallahassee by Professor Bruce S.
Rogow challenging the constitutionality of the changes. See Ad Rule Opponents Seek
Injunction, FLA. B. NEWS, May 1, 1991, at 1, col. 4. The suit remained pending at the
close of the current survey period. See Elizabeth Willson, A Troublesome Fly vs. The
Bar, FLA. TREND, July 1991, at 29.
40. Advertising Issues, 571 So. 2d at 452-54 (describing revised rule 4-7.2).
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tion was paid to the remainder of the proposals. As a result, admiralty
lawyers failed to object to the bar's suggested rewriting of rule 4-
7.5(b).
Rule 4-7.5, entitled "Communication of Fields of Practice," had
gone into effect on January 1, 1987, as part of Florida's switch from
the American Bar Association's 1969 Model Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility to its 1983 Model Rules of Professional Conduct."1 Like its
predecessors, rule 4-7.5(b) continued to carve out an exception for law-
yers engaged in admiralty practice by permitting such lawyers to call
themselves "proctors in admiralty" and to otherwise identify them-
selves as being admiralty practitioners."2 As the rule noted in its ac-
companying comment, this exception to the general ban on lawyers
holding themselves out as specialists in a given field of law was rooted
in the "long historical tradition associated with maritime commerce
and the federal courts." '
In 1975, Florida instituted a program under which attorneys can
designate themselves as being competent in a given field if they met
(and thereafter continued to meet) certain basic requirements." Later,
in 1982, Florida began a second program through which lawyers can be
certified by the bar as having expertise in certain fields."5
In 1990, the United States Supreme Court, in the Illinois case of
Peel v. Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission of Illi-
nois,4" held that attorneys who are certified as proficient in a given area
of law by a bona fide national organization cannot be denied the right
to list such certifications on their letterheads and in their advertising.47
Worried that rule 4-7.5 might be unconstitutional after Peel, the Bar's
petition suggested that it be redrafted as well as renumbered. As
amended, new rule 4-7.6 permits a lawyer who complies with the Flor-
41. See The Florida Bar re Rules Regulating the Florida Bar, 494 So. 2d 977,
1074 (Fla. 1986).
42. See id. at 1075. Rule 4-7.5(b) was patterned after canon 46 of the American
Bar Association's 1908 Canons of Professional Ethics as well as Ethical Consideration
2-14 of the Model Code. See generally Robert M. Jarvis, Rethinking the Meaning of
the Phrase "Surviving Widow" in the Jones Act: Has the Time Come for Admiralty
Courts to Fashion A Federal Law of Domestic Relations?, 21 CAL. W. L. REv. 463,
479 n.58 (1985).
43. FLORIDA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4-7.5 comment.
44. See In re The Florida Bar, 319 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1975).
45. See The Florida Bar, 414 So. 2d 490 (Fla. 1982).
46. 110 S. Ct. 2281 (1990).
47. Id. at 2293.
1991]
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ida Certification Plan, "or who is certified by a national group with
substantially similar standards to the Florida Certification Plan," to
state that he or she has been so certified. 48
In their new versions, both the rule and the comment delete all
references to admiralty and the admiralty exception, and neither offers
a single word of explanation for the change. This is troubling for at
least three reasons. First, the Florida Certification Plan does not cur-
rently operate in the area of admiralty law (although the Designation
Plan does).49 Second, there is no national organization that presently
certifies admiralty lawyers. 50 Third, although the admiralty exception
was excised, the similar exception for patent lawyers was retained (al-
though the explanatory comment was not). 51 Despite these facts, by the
close of the survey period admiralty lawyers in Florida had not begun
any efforts to have the exception reinstated.
48. Advertising Issues, 571 So. 2d at 454-55.
49. The Florida Certification Plan currently certifies Florida lawyers in the fol-
lowing seven areas: tax, civil trial law, marital and family law, estate planning and
probate, criminal law, real estate law, and workers' compensation. See The Florida Bar
re Amendment to Rules Regulating The Florida Bar Chapter 6 (Legal Specialization
and Education), 548 So. 2d 1120 (Fla. 1989).
50. The Maritime Law Association of the United States, a national bar group
founded in 1899, comes the closest of any existing organization to certifying the compe-
tence of admiralty lawyers. At one time, all lawyers who joined the MLA became
"proctor" members. Since the early 1980s, however, lawyers who join the MLA have
become "associate" members. After four years, they may apply to become proctor
members. In order to move from associate membership to proctor membership, a candi-
date must demonstrate "proficiency" in admiralty. Such proficiency can be shown in a
variety of ways, including attendance at approved continuing legal education seminars,
delivery of speeches or publication of articles on suitable topics, or serving as counsel in
maritime proceedings. There is no written or oral test, however, and once a lawyer
obtains proctor membership there is no further obligation except for payment of a
small annual dues charge. See Maritime Law Ass'n, Articles of Association and By-
Laws-Document No. 684 § III, at 1 (Sept. 1990).
51. Advertising Issues, 571 So. 2d at 470. The comment to rule 4-7.5 had stated
that patent law was a specialty because of the "long-established policy of the patent
and trademark office." Although The Florida Bar once tried to challenge the policy, it
was rebuffed by the United States Supreme Court in a landmark case. See Sperry v.
Florida ex rel. The Florida Bar, 373 U.S. 379 (1963). Justice Overton did not offer any
explanation for why the patent law exception was being retained or for why the com-
ment was being deleted.
[Vol. 16
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II. CARRIAGE OF GOODS
There were three cases during the months under review that in-
volved disputes arising under the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act
(COGSA). 2
In Insurance Company of North America v. Empresa Lineas
Maritimas Argentinas, S.A.," a cargo of washing machine parts bound
for Miami was damaged in Buenos Aires when the container in which
they had been packed was dropped while under the control of the de-
fendant, Empresa Lineas Maritimas Argentinas, S.A. (ELMA)."4 Sub-
sequently, the Insurance Company of North America (INA), which
had become subrogated to the plaintiff, filed suit to recover
$29,65 3. 11.55
Shortly after the case was started, INA moved for partial sum-
mary judgment. 6 In response, ELMA filed an opposing memorandum
that argued that summary judgment was premature for three reasons:
1) the bill of lading had not been authenticated, 2) an essential para-
graph of the bill of lading had not been translated into English, and 3)
there was no proof that a higher freight rate had been charged. 57
ELMA further argued that even if summary judgment was appropri-
ate, ELMA was entitled to the benefit of COGSA's $500 package
limitation."
In an exceedingly terse opinion, District Judge Moore rejected
52. 46 U.S.C. §§ 1300-1315 (1988). Under COGSA shipowners are excused
from liability if goods in their possession are damaged due to certain specified causes.
See THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME LAW § 9-13, at 314-15
(1987).
53. 1991 AMC 1057 (M.D. Fla. 1990).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 1059. The point of ELMA's third argument was explained by Judge
Moore in the following manner: "In general, when a shipper wants the cargo to receive
a higher value [than is provided under COGSA], the carrier offsets this increased lia-
bility by charging a higher freight rate." Insurance Co. of N. Am., 1991 AMC at
1059. By paying a higher freight rate, the shipper avoids the COGSA package limita-
tion. See infra note 58.
58. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 1991 AMC at 1058. The package limitation, found
at 46 U.S.C. § 1304(5) (1988), limits a defendant's liability to $500 per package or
customary freight unit unless the shipper has declared a higher value. If the defendant
can invoke successfully the limitation, its liability will be drastically reduced and the
plaintiff will be only partially compensated for its loss. See generally FRANE L.
MARAIST, ADMIRALTY LAW IN A NUTSHELL 74-77 (2d ed. 1988).
1991]
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each of ELMA's arguments and granted INA's motion.5' Finding that
the case was governed by COGSA due to the fact that the cargo had
been bound for an American port and was traveling under a bill of
lading,60 Judge Moore focused his attention on the terms of the bill of
lading. Although largely illegible, both parties agreed that the bill de-
scribed the merchandise as 2,160 gear boxes with a per piece value of
$74.80." As such, the only real issue was whether ELMA could have
the benefit of the package limitation.
Judge Moore found that ELMA was not entitled to the limitation
for the very reasons that it had given in suggesting that the motion for
partial summary judgment was premature. First, Judge Moore ruled
that while the bill of lading was unauthenticated, ELMA had admitted
that it accurately described the cargo.62 Second, although the para-
graph in the bill of lading that ELMA contended might be relevant
had not been translated, ELMA had neglected to offer any explanation
for its failure to provide a translation in its response. 3 Third, while the
record did not contain any proof that INA's insured had paid a higher
freight rate, the lack of such proof, in Judge Moore's view, was "not
determinative inasmuch as charging an increased freight rate is not a
prerequisite to declaring a higher value of cargo."'
°
The next cargo case of the survey period, Z.K. Marine, Inc. v. MI
V Archigetis,65 also involved construction of the COGSA package limi-
tation. In September, 1987, five yachts were shipped from Taiwan to
the United States aboard a vessel known as the M/V ARCHIGETIS.6'
At the time, the ARCHIGETIS was owned by Malvern Maritime, Inc.
(Malvern), and was under charter to Federal Pacific Liberia, Ltd.
(Fedpac). 71 The yachts had been manufactured by Offshore Marine,
59. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 1991 AMC at 1059-60.
60. Id. at 1058. This is the threshold inquiry in any COGSA suit, of course,
since the statute applies only to shipments traveling by sea to or from a United States
port under a bill of lading. See 46 U.S.C. §§ 1300 and 1312 (1988).
61. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 1991 AMC at 1058-59.
62. Id. at 1059.
63. Id. With more than a trace of irritation, Judge Moore wrote: "Defendant
fails to indicate why an English translation of this supposedly essential paragraph,
which could have been accomplished quickly and inexpensively, was not included in its
response." Id. at 1059 n.l.
64. Id. at 1059.
65. 1991 AMC 1434 (S.D. Fla. 1991).
66. Id. at 1436.
67. Id. at 1435-36.
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Inc. (Offshore), and were unloaded upon their arrival in the United
States by Continental Stevedoring & Terminals, Inc. (Continental). 8
The five yachts were imported by four different Florida companies:
Z.K. Marine, Inc., Southern Offshore Yachts, Jay Bettis and Co., and
Miller 'Yacht Sales, Inc. (collectively, the plaintiffs). 9
Upon discovering that the yachts had arrived in a damaged condi-
tion, the plaintiffs filed suit against the ARCHIGETIS as well as Mal-
vern, Fedpac, Offshore, and Continental.7 0 In response, Malvern moved
for summary judgment on the ground that the bills of lading clearly
limited the carrier's liability to $500 per package or customary freight
unit or, in this case, per yacht.7 1 Fedpac and Continental then moved
for partial summary judgment and the plaintiffs cross-moved for sum-
mary judgment.7
Electing to resolve all of the motions together, District Judge
Hoeveler held, in a case of first impression, that each yacht was in fact
a COGSA package. As such, he granted the defendants' motions.7 3
Judge Hoeveler began his opinion by first noting that COGSA was
not directly applicable since the yachts had been carried on the
ARCHIGETIS' decks, and COGSA does not apply to on-deck car-
riage .7 He found, however, that since the bills of lading referred to
The Hague Rules, the international version of COGSA, the parties
would be deemed to have "stipulated by contract" to the application of
COGSA.
Having disposed of the choice of law problem, Judge Hoeveler
moved to the central issue: were the yachts COGSA packages? After a
review of the existing caselaw on the subject, he concluded that they
were because the carrier had attached each yacht to a cradle that had
been manufactured by Offshore. According to Judge Hoeveler, by rest-
ing in a cradle, each yacht had become the functional equivalent of a
package during the voyage. For support, he turned to a case in which
Judge Spellman had found that air conditioning equipment that had
been bolted to wooden skids but was not otherwise boxed was a
68. id. at 1436.
69. Id. at 1435.
70. Z.K. Marine, 1991 AMC at 1436.
71. Id.
72. I'd.
73. Id. at 1441.
74. d. at 1437 (citing 46 U.S.C. § 1301(c) (1988)). For a general discussion of
the law relating to deck cargo, see SCHOENBAUM, supra note 52, § 9-16, at 322-24.
75. Z.K. Marine, 1991 AMC at 1438.
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COGSA package.7 6 In Judge Hoeveler's view, the cradles were "analo-
gous, for purposes of the package analysis, to skids."'7 Having so
found, Judge Hoeveler summarily dismissed the remainder of the plain-
tiffs' arguments.7 8
The final cargo case also involved the carriage of a yacht. In
Jumbo Navigation, N.V. v. Melchior,79 Jumbo Navigation, N.V.
(Jumbo), an ocean carrier, filed an interpleader action to determine
whether a yacht called the S/Y VALIA belonged to Cigisped, S.R.I.
(Cigisped), an Italian freight forwarder, or to Albert Melchior, a Ca-
nadian citizen.80 In September, 1988, Melchior had agreed to pay
Cigisped $75,000 in ocean freight, plus $1,640 in preparation expenses,
to ship his yacht from Genoa to Miami.81 Cigisped, in turn, retained
Jumbo, and in October, 1988 Jumbo carried the VALIA to Miami
aboard the M/V STELLA PRIMA pursuant to a bill of lading made
out to Cigisped. 2
The STELLA PRIMA arrived in Miami on November 7, 1988,
and discharged the VALIA into the water, during which the VALIA
was damaged.8 3 When Melchior demanded delivery of the yacht,
Jumbo informed him that it was under orders from Cigisped to hold on
to the VALIA until Melchior paid Cigisped and that as a result, the
VALIA was being placed in the custody of the Merrill Stevens Dry
Dock Company, Inc. (Merrill Stevens). 8' Following this exchange,
Melchior filed an emergency motion for the release of the yacht, Mer-
rill Stevens initiated its own interpleader action, and Cigisped filed
cross-claims against Melchior."6
In time, Melchior deposited $80,000 into the registry of the court,
Merrill Stevens completed extensive repairs on the yacht at Melchior's
76. See Marante Forwarding v. C.A. Naviera de Transporte y Turismo, 486 F.
Supp. 636, 1982 AMC 2704 (S.D. Fla. 1980).
77. Z.K. Marine, 1991 AMC at 1440.
78. In particular, Judge Hoeveler rejected the plaintiffs' argument that they had
had no opportunity to declare a higher value because they had purchased the bills of
lading while the ARCHIGETIS was at sea and that Continental, as a stevedore, was
not covered by the COGSA package limitation. Id. 1439-41.
79. 1991 AMC 1518 (S.D. Fla. 1991).
80. Id. at 1518.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 1519.
84. Jumbo Navigation, 1991 AMC at 1519.
85. Id.
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request and was paid by Melchior's insurer, the Wausau Insurance
Company (which then brought a suit against Jumbo in state court),
Cigisped, which still had not been paid by Melchior, moved for sum-
mary judgment, and the case was transferred from the docket of Dis-
trict Judge Nesbitt to District Judge Moreno upon the latter's investi-
ture in the fall of 1990.86
In opposing Cigisped's motion for summary judgment, Melchior
argued that there was a genuine issue of fact as to whether Cigisped
had agreed that it would not be entitled to collect freight if the yacht
was not delivered to Miami in perfect condition. 7 In just four brief
paragraphs, however, Judge Moreno rejected Melchior's argument as
"unpersuasive."
Relying on a recent decision by the Third District Court of Ap-
peal,88 Judge Moreno found that under both COGSA and Florida state
law Melchior's sole recourse for the damages sustained by the VALIA
was against Jumbo. He explained this result by writing: "Florida law is
well established that a freight forwarder, such as Cigisped, does not
incur liability for cargo damage while such cargo is in the possession
and control of an ocean carrier." 89 As such, Judge Moreno granted
Cigisped's motion and ordered the clerk of the court to release to
Cigisped the money that Melchior had deposited into the court's
registry 90
III. CRIMINAL OFFENSES
As usual, the survey period produced a number of criminal cases
involving ships.91 In the first, National Marine Underwriters, Inc. v.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 1520.
88. See Golden Triad Carrier, Inc. v. Paco Am. Corp., 553 So. 2d 247 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
89. Jumbo Navigation, 1991 AMC at 1520.
90. Id.
91. Some of these cases, however, had only a tangential connection to admiralty
law. See, e.g., United States v. Gutierrez, 931 F.2d 1482 (11 th Cir.), cert. denied, 112
S. Ct. 398 (1991) (defendants who had been arrested as a result of a sting operation in
which federal agents portrayed Colombian drug smugglers with sailboats ready to
transport cocaine into the country had been correctly adjudged guilty, but one of the
defendants was entitled to be resentenced); United States v. Mieres-Borges, 919 F.2d
652 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1633 (1991) (record sustained the con-
viction of one defendant, but not the other, where both had been found guilty of at-
tempting to smuggle cocaine into the country by means of an air drop to a waiting
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Loring,92 a Chris Craft boat owned by Drs. Richard Krieger and Nolan
Altman was stolen. After Krieger and Altman received payment from
their insurer, Colonial Penn, they executed a release subrogating all of
their rights to Colonial Penn. 93 Thereafter, Colonial Penn gave a power
of attorney to National Marine Underwriters, Inc. (National
Marine). 4 In turn, National Marine sued Keith S. Loring, claiming
that he was responsible for the theft.95
Loring responded to the suit by arguing that National Marine had
failed to obtain a "managing general agent permit," as required under
the Florida insurance code.96 Finding that National Marine had in fact
failed to obtain the permit, Circuit Judge Robinson struck National
Marine's complaint as a sham pleading.97
On appeal, however, District Judges Barkdull, Nesbitt, and Jor-
genson reversed Judge Robinson and remanded the case to him for fur-
ther proceedings. Although the panel agreed that there was some evi-
dence in the record to support Loring's argument,9" it refused to let
him use it. In a short per curiam opinion, the panel wrote: "The claim
brought by National Marine for Colonial Penn is as though Drs. Krie-
ger and Altman had sued Loring. In such a subrogation claim, the
third party causing injury to an insured cannot rely upon defenses that
might have been raised between the insurer and the insured."99
The next two criminal cases of the survey period arose out of Flor-
ida's continuing attempt to track down and seize vessels that are used
in the drug trade. In In re Forfeiture of One 31' Seahawk "Cigarette"
Vessel,1"' the City of Pompano Beach sought to forfeit a vessel that
had been found without a hull identification number.10 1 Circuit Judge
Dimitrouleas dismissed the complaint, however, on the ground that the
ship); United States v. Castillo-Valencia, 917 F.2d 494 (11 th Cir. 1990), cert. denied,
111 S. Ct. 1321 (1991) (evidence supported conviction and sentencing of defendants
who attempted to smuggle into the country 495 bales of marijuana stored in their
ship's hold).
92. 568 So. 2d 1007 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
93. Id. at 1007.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 1007-08.
96. Id. at 1007 (citing FLA. STAT. § 626.121(2) (1985)).
97. National Marine, 568 So. 2d at 1007.
98. Id. at 1007 n.1.
99. Id. at 1008.
100. 572 So. 2d 1038 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
101. Id. at 1039.
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City had failed to show that the vessel had been used in the commis-
sion of a felony."0 2 The City then filed an appeal.' 03
In a per curiam decision that provoked a vigorous dissent, District
Judges Glickstein and Oftedal affirmed the dismissal. After a review of
the Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act's checkered legislative his-
tory,10 ' they concluded that the statute required an affirmative showing
of wrongdoing:
For the vessel in the instant case to be subject to forfeiture, the
City was required to allege either guilty knowledge or intent. The
verified amended complaint does not allege that the owners "know-
ingly or intentionally" concealed the vessel or misrepresented the
identity of the vessel in violation of [the statute] .. . The City
was given the opportunity to amend further and chose not to do
SO. 
1 0 5
In dissent, District Judge Anstead agreed with the majority that it
had not been the legislature's intention to forfeit the ships of innocent
owners."1) But he argued that the burden was on the owner and not the
government. He explained his position by writing: "[I]t appears to me
that the legislature has put the burden on the innocent owner to estab-
lish his innocence. While there may be constitutional implications to
this scheme, these issues have not been raised in this appeal and were
not addressed below."1 07
Several months later, another vessel forfeiture case made its way
to the Fourth District. In In re Forfeiture of One 1987 Velocity 30' Go-
Fast Vessel,10 8 Broward County Sheriff Nick Navarro filed a complaint
seeking to forfeit a boat and a boat trailer that belonged to Victor
Dessberg because the boat lacked a hull identification number. 09 Cir-
cuit Judge Moriarty denied the petition and Navarro appealed. 10
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 1039-40. Shortly after the survey period ended, the Florida Supreme
Court, in an opinion by Justice Barkett, upheld the Act while expressing grave doubts
about its constitutionality. See Department of Law Enforcement v. Real Property, 588
So. 2d 957 (Fla. 1991).
105. Seahawk, 572 So. 2d at 1040.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. 577 So. 2d 678 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
109. Id. at 679.
110. Id.
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In a brief per curiam opinion, a panel consisting of Chief Judge
Hersey, District Judge Polen, and Senior District Judge Walden af-
firmed the denial. " ' Relying on Seahawk, they wrote: "In a recent
opinion this court ruled that in order to support forfeiture some wrong-
doing must be alleged in addition to mere possession of a vessel with
altered or covered hull numbers. There must be either guilty knowledge
or intent alleged."" 2
The final criminal case of the period also stemmed from the war
on drugs. In United States v. Thompson," 3 a United States Coast
Guard boarding party had discovered 412 kilograms of cocaine during
a documents and safety inspection aboard a cruiser-trawler named the
MOLLY BETH while she was in the Windward Passage, approxi-
mately 500 miles from the United States." 4 Subsequently, James M.
Thompson, who had recently become the owner as well as the captain
of the MOLLY BETH, was placed under arrest and charged with con-
spiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine while on an Ameri-
can vessel.115
Thompson moved to have the cocaine suppressed."' When District
Judge Aronovitz denied the motion, Thompson entered a conditional
guilty plea and then appealed the denial of his motion.'1 7 On appeal,
Circuit Judge Cox, in an opinion joined in by Circuit Judge Kravitch
and Senior Circuit Judge Henderson, affirmed the denial of Thomp-
son's motion." 8
Thompson had argued before the trial court and then again on
appeal that the Coast Guard's search had violated his fourth amend-
ment privacy rights under the United States Constitution as well as
Article 24 of the Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the
Contiguous Zone." 9 Judge Cox, however, made short work of both of
these arguments. With respect to the fourth amendment, he ruled that
Thompson had no legitimate expectation of privacy during the Coast
Guard's search because he had consented to the search, the search was
111. Id. at 680.
112. Id. at 679.
113. 928 F.2d 1060 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 270 (1991).
114. Id. at 1061.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 1063.
117. Id.
118. Thompson, 928 F.2d at 1061.
119. Id. at 1063. The Convention, which entered into force in the United States
in 1964, appears at 15 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639.
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undertaken pursuant to statutory authorization, and the search oc-
curred outside the territory of the United States where the strictures of
the fourth amendment apply, if at all, only very slightly. 1 0 Having dis-
posed of Thompson's first argument, Judge Cox devoted even less time
to Thompson's other contention. Although noting that the United
States is a party to the Geneva Convention, Judge Cox found that the
Convention had not created any privately enforceable rights.121 As
such, Judge Cox concluded that any objection based on the Convention
missed the mark because "Thompson does not have standing to protest
an alleged violation of the treaty. 1 22
IV. LIENS
The period under review produced two cases involving maritime
liens. Although both presented rather straightforward fact patterns,
they still made for interesting reading.
In Stevens Technical Services, Inc. v. United States,'23 the plain-
tiff, Stevens Technical Services, Inc. (Stevens) brought suit against the
United States and Atlantic Sandblasting & Coatings, Inc. (Atlantic)
for repairs it had performed on the U.S.S. SEALIFT ANTARCTIC.
The ship, an auxiliary tanker, had been demise chartered to the United
States through the Military Sealift Command (MSC) and was being
operated by Marine Transport Lines, Inc. (MTL)."4 In 1985, she un-
derwent a planned major overhaul at Atlantic's repair facility in
Tampa, with half of the overhaul work being done by Atlantic and the
rest carried out by Stevens.' 2 '
The overhaul was completed as scheduled and, following various
inspections by both MSC and MTL, the SEALIFT ANTARCTIC was
120. Thompson, 928 F.2d at 1063-66. In rejecting Thompson's Fourth Amend-
ment argument, Judge Cox again made it clear that one's rights while on the water are
not the same as those enjoyed on land: "At sea, a person's expectation of privacy may
be severely restricted compared with expectations of privacy on land." Id. at 1064
(quoting United States v. Lopez, 761 F.2d 632, 635 (11th Cir. 1985)). For a further
discussion, see Howard S. Marks, Comment, The Fourth Amendment: Rusting on the
High Seas?, 34 MERCER L. REV. 1537 (1983).
121. Id. at 1066.
122. Id.
123. 913 F.2d 1521, 1991 AMC 2497 (11th Cir. 1990).
124. Id. at 1525, 1991 AMC at 2502.
125. Id. The overhaul included "tank cleaning, repainting and coatings and ma-
jor engine and machinery work." Id.
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redelivered to the United States.126 MTL then paid Atlantic in full, for
which it later was reimbursed by MSC.127 Atlantic failed to pay Ste-
vens, however, and Stevens therefore filed suit against the United
States and Atlantic.128
The case was referred to visiting District Judge Alaimo, who con-
ducted a bench trial.12 9 Following the trial, he held that Stevens could
recover against Atlantic,30 but was barred by the Public Vessels Act
(PVA)'31 from recovering against the United States. 82 Upon receiving
the decision, Stevens filed an appeal. 133
The appeal was heard by a panel consisting of Circuit Judges
Vance and Anderson and visiting Senior Circuit Judge Brown. Shortly
after the oral argument, however, Judge Vance was assassinated. The
opinion therefore was issued by Judges Brown and Anderson and was
written by Judge Brown.1 " In it, Judge Brown reversed Judge Alaimo's
conclusion that the PVA barred Stevens' suit against the govern-
ment,1 35 and remanded the case for a determination as to whether Ste-
vens was entitled to assert a maritime lien against the SEALIFT
ANTARCTIC.3 "
Judge Brown began his decision by tracing the history of the
PVA.137 Based on this review, Judge Brown concluded that Stevens had
the right to sue the government for the work it had performed and,
with the exception of being barred from actually arresting the
SEALIFT ANTARCTIC, was entitled to go forward in the same man-
ner as if the vessel had been owned by a private party.138
Having found that the PVA did not bar Stevens' suit, Judge
Brown then turned to Stevens' assertion that the repairs it had per-
formed gave rise to a maritime lien. Here Judge Brown found the rec-
126. Id. at 1525-26, 1991 AMC at 2502.
127. Stevens, 913 F.2d at 1526, 1991 AMC at 2502.
128. Id., 1991 AMC at 2502-03.
129. Id., 1991 AMC at 2503.
130. Id.
131. 46 U.S.C. §§ 781-790 (1988). The PVA and its sister statute, the Suits in
Admiralty Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 741-752 (1988), are described in detail in Fritz G.
Faerber, Admiralty Claims Against the United States, 20 FORUM 122 (1984).
132. Stevens, 913 F.2d 1526, 1991 AMC at 2503.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 1523.
135. Id. at 1537, 1991 AMC at 2521.
136. Id.
137. Stevens, 913 F.2d at 1526-34, 1991 AMC at 2503-16.
138. Id. at 1534, 1991 AMC at 2515-16.
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ord incomplete. Although it was clear that Stevens had done the work
for which it was seeking payment, 3 9 it was open to dispute whether
Stevens had relied on the credit of the SEALIFT ANTARCTIC, as
opposed to the credit of Atlantic. Noting that reliance on a vessel is a
basic requirement for assertion of a maritime lien, Judge Brown held
that further proceedings at the trial court were necessary." 0
The other lien case of the survey period was Kaleidoscope Tours
v. M/V "Tropicana.""' From December 1, 1988 to May 14, 1989, the
plaintiff, Kaleidoscope Tours (Kaleidoscope), had provided embarka-
tion services to the M/V TROPICANA, a passenger cruise ship, at the
Port of Miami."' These services consisted of collecting money and tick-
ets from passengers, checking passports, embarking temporary crew
members and ship's employees, and accounting for and delivering the
fares to the ship's pier supervisors.14 3 Although Kaleidoscope was paid
for most of its services, it was not paid for those it rendered between
March 27, 1989 and May 14, 1989.'" In order to recover for these
services, which it valued at $20,350, Kaleidoscope asserted a lien
against the TROPICANA and had her arrested."5
Kaleidoscope's case was referred to District Judge Ryskamp, who
conducted a bench trial." 6 After reviewing the pertinent facts, he de-
cided that there were two key questions in the case: 1) was the contract
under which Kaleidoscope had acted "maritime in nature," and, 2)
were the services provided "necessaries" for purposes of the Federal
139. Id. at 1535, 1991 AMC at 2517-18.
140. Id. at 1536-37, 1991 AMC at 2519-21. Because it had not been argued at
the trial court, Judge Brown did not reach the government's argument that the Con-
tract Disputes Act of 1978 (CDA), 41 U.S.C. §§ 601-613 (1988), barred Stevens' suit.
In dicta, however, Judge Brown stated that if the argument had been raised in a timely
fashion, he would have rejected it on the ground that the CDA does not control a
party's right to assert a maritime lien. Stevens, 913 F.2d at 1537, 1991 AMC at 2521.
A short time later, in a case that had been held in abeyance pending Stevens, a panel
consisting of Circuit Judges Fay and Edmondson and visiting Senior Circuit Judge
Garza held that the CDA does not affect a party's right to claim a maritime lien. See
Marine Coatings of Alabama, Inc. v. United States, 932 F.2d 1370, 1991 AMC 2487
(11th Cir. 1991).
141. 755 F. Supp. 382, 1991 AMC 1462 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
142. Id. at 383, 1991 AMC at 1463.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Kaleidoscope, 755 F. Supp. at 383, 1991 AMC at 1463.
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Maritime Lien Act (FMLA)? 1 7 In a short and well-reasoned opinion,
he concluded that the answer to both questions was yes:
[T]he collection of and accounting for passengers' fares and tickets
and the checking of passports for immigration services are essential
to the voyage of a cruise ship. "Without these, there can be no
voyage . . . ." This court therefore concludes that the embarkation
services performed by Kaleidoscope are "necessaries" which give
rise to a maritime lien under the FMLA. Thus, the contract pursu-
ant to which these services were performed is a maritime contract,
and the court has jurisdiction to enforce the maritime lien. 14 8
V. PERSONAL INJURY
A. Longshore and Harbor Workers
Cases about longshore and harbor workers do not often make
news, but Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc." 9 proved to be an
exception. Lois Robinson had been a ship welder at two shipyards run
by the defendant, Jacksonville Shipyard, Inc. (JSI).150 She had joined
JSI in September, 1977 as a third-class welder and had been steadily
promoted until she reached the status of first-class welder.15'
While working at JSI, Robinson was constantly surrounded by pic-
tures of nude women and confronted by sexually-suggestive comments
and graffiti. 5 Although she complained about the working environ-
ment at JSI to her superiors, 53 the problems grew worse."' Finally, in
147. Id., 1991 AMC at 1464. The text of the FMLA can be found at 46
U.S.C.A. §§ 31341-31343 (West. Supp. 1990).
148. Kaleidoscope, 755 F. Supp. at 385, 1991 AMC at 1466.
149. 760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991).
150. Id. at 1491. Robinson worked at both the Mayport Yard, situated in the
Mayport Naval Station, and at the Commercial Yard, located on the riverfront in
downtown Jacksonville. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 1493-94.
153. In addition to complaining to her superiors, Robinson filed a grievance with
her union and registered a complaint with the Jacksonville Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission (EEOC). The union, however, refused to pursue the matter and the
EEOC sent Robinson a letter informing her that it had found that "no reasonable
cause existed" to believe that she had been discriminated against on account of her sex.
Robinson, 760 F. Supp. at 1516-17.
154. Id. at 1500-01.
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September, 1986, Robinson filed a sexual discrimination lawsuit
against JSI.'5 In her suit Robinson sought to force JSI to implement a
comprehensive sexual harassment policy, pay her money damages, and
delete from her employment record warnings that she had received for
excessive absenteeism. "
Robinson's case was assigned to District Judge -Melton and
culminated in an eight day bench trial in January and February,
1989.157 'Two years later, in March, 1991, Judge Melton issued his final
judgment. In a highly-publicized opinion 15 1 that ran sixty-one pub-
lished pages, Judge Melton ruled that Robinson had been subjected to
a sexually hostile work environment.1 59 After engaging in an exhaustive
review of the voluminous and often-conflicting record, including testi-
mony from Robinson's co-workers and the opinions of expert witnesses,
Judge Melton concluded:
A reasonable woman would find that the working environment at
JSI was abusive. This conclusion reaches the totality of the circum-
stances, including the sexual remarks, the sexual jokes, the sexu-
ally-oriented pictures of women, and the nonsexual rejection of
women by coworkers. The testimony by Dr. Fiske and Ms. Wagner
provides a reliable basis upon which to conclude that the cumula-
tive, corrosive effect of this work environment over time affects the
psychological well-being of a reasonable woman placed in these
conditions.160
Having found that Robinson had been the victim of an illegal
work environment, Judge Melton turned to the question of remedies.
He first concluded that with respect to monetary compensation Robin-
son was entitled to only $1.00 in nominal damages because she had
failed to prove that JSI's conduct had caused her to sustain economic
damages.161 He did find, however, that under federal law Robinson was
155. Id. at 1517. Robinson's suit was based on Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, which prohibits employers from discriminating on the basis of gender. Id. at
1490. The Act is codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e (1988).
156. Robinson, 760 F. Supp. at 1519.
157. Id. at 1490.
158. Judge Melton's decision was reported by such diverse publications as The
Chicago Tribune, The New York Times, Newsday, The Seattle Times, The National
Law Journal, Business Week, Playboy, and Time.
159. Id. at 1491.
160. Id. at 1524.
161. Id. at 1532-34.
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entitled to have JSI pay her attorneys' fees and costs since she had won
nominal damages. 162
Judge Melton then moved to the subject of injunctive relief. Here
he found that Robinson had met her burden of proof. 63 He therefore
ordered JSI to adopt and enforce a policy for preventing sexual harass-
ment. Because he was concerned that JSI's past history made it a poor
candidate for devising an acceptable sexual harassment plan on its own,
Judge Melton set forth in detail the elements that the plan would have
to contain. 6
In justifying his hands-on approach, Judge Melton wrote:
The history of management's condonation and approval of sexually
harassing conditions, together with the past failures to redress ef-
fectively those instances of sexual harassment of which manage-
ment disapproved, argues forcefully for affirmative relief that pro-
vides guidance for all employees regarding acceptable and offensive
conduct, provides confidence to female employees that their valid
complaints of sexual harassment will be remedied, and provides
male employees who transgress the boundaries of sexual harass-
ment with notice that their conduct will be penalized commensu-
rate with the seriousness of the offense.1 65
162. Id. at 1538-39.
163. Robinson, 760 F. Supp. at 1534.
164. Id. at 1538. Recognizing that his plan might need certain modifications in
order to be implemented successfully, Judge Melton gave JSI thirty days "to submit
any specific objections that relate to its ability to implement and enforce the policy and
procedures, as modified." Id. at 1537. Judge Melton cautioned JSI, however, that its
objections were to be based solely on its ability to practically execute the court's man-
date, and were not to "concern the substance" of the court's decision. Id.
165. Id. at 1534. Lois Robinson was not the first female plaintiff to use maritime
law to strike a blow for sexual equality. For other such cases, see Robert M. Jarvis,
Sexual Equality Before the Silver Oar. Lifting the Fog on Women, Ships, and the
Law of Admiralty, 7 CARDozo L. REV. 93 (1985). Shortly after the survey period
ended, however, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of a case very similar to
Robinson. In Wilson v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 939 F.2d 260 (5th Cir. 1991), Elizabeth
Wilson, a motorhand, brought a Jones Act suit against her employer claiming that it
had permitted a hostile work environment to develop and remain aboard its ships. Like
the district court, the Fifth Circuit found that the claim was time-barrred because it
had been brought more than three years after the sexual harrassment had occurred.
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B. Passengers
The survey period produced three cases involving injuries to ship
passengers. In the first, Keefe v. Bahama Cruise Line, Inc., 6 the long-
running saga of Rita Patricia Keefe appears to have finally come to an
end. Keefe, a hairdresser, along with the other members of her bowling
team, had been a passenger aboard the S/S VERA CRUZ during a
two day "Cruise to Nowhere" in June, 1984.167 While dancing on the
ship's outdoor dance floor one night, she had slipped and injured her-
self.'68 A bench trial was held in March, 1988 before District Judge
Kovachevich, who found that Keefe was entitled to recover
$10,657.60.19 The owner of the VERA CRUZ, Bahama Cruise Line,
Inc. (BCL), appealed Judge Kovachevich's decision to the Eleventh
Circuit, and obtained an order remanding the question of liability and
requiring Keefe to pay the costs of the appeal. 70
On remand, Judge Kovachevich readopted her earlier opinion and
again entered judgment in favor of Keefe.' 7 ' BCL then took a second
appeal. This time the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the judgment and or-
dered BCL to pay costs to Keefe. 172 Keefe then filed a motion with
Judge Kovachevich asking her to enter judgment in the amount of
$10,657.60, together with court costs, appellate costs, and interest at an
annual rate of 6.71% from March 31, 1988, the date of the original
judgment. 7 3 In response, BCL argued that interest and costs should
run only from July 17, 1989, the date of Judge Kovachevich's second
judgment. 174
Agreeing with the parties that there was a split in the law among
the circuits, 175 Judge Kovachevich decided to side with Keefe:
166. 753 F. Supp. 349, 1991 AMC 1397 (M.D. Fla. 1990).
167. Keefe v. Bahama Cruise Line, Inc., 682 F. Supp. 1191, 1192 (M.D. Fla.
1988).
168. Id. at 1192.
169. Id. at 1195. Judge Kovachevich awarded Keefe $7,000.00 in compensatory
damages and $3,657.60 for medical costs. Id.
170. Keefe v. Bahama Cruise Line, Inc., 867 F.2d 1318, 1990 AMC 46 (lth
Cir. 1989). This aspect of the Keefe litigation is discussed in Nathaniel G. W. Pieper
& David W. McCreadie, Cruise Ship Passenger Claims and Defenses, 21 J. MAR. L.
& COM. 151, 175 (1990).
171. Keefe v. Bahama Cruise Line, Inc., 715 F. Supp. 1069 (M.D. Fla. 1989).
172. Keefe v. Bahama Cruise Line, Inc., 902 F.2d 959 (11th Cir. 1990).
173. Keefe, 753 F. Supp. at 351, 1991 AMC at 1399.
174. Id.
175. Id. (citing Chattem, Inc. v. Bailey, 486 U.S. 1059 (1988) (White, J.,
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In this case, the questions addressed in the first instance and on
remand were resolved in the same manner. This Court found De-
fendant liable, found the claim not to be time-barred, and awarded
identical damages . . . . The damages were meaningfully "ascer-
tained" at the time of the original judgment . . . . The Court con-
cludes that interest in this cause of action should appropriately be
calculated from the date of the original judgment, March 31,
1988.176
The next passenger case was Perlman v. Valdes.11 Sherry Lynn
Valdes had died from injuries sustained when the speedboat in which
she was riding struck an unlighted, unused concrete pier.17" Following
her death her husband, Jose, and her parents, Jack and Linda Newton,
brought a wrongful death suit against George D. Perlman, the trustee
of the City Isles Trust (Trust), the owner of the pier, on the ground
that it had been negligent in failing to light the pier in accordance with
federal regulations. 1 9
The Trust moved for and received summary judgment on the
Newtons' claim.18 0 The remaining claims were then tried to a jury. The
jury found that the Trust was guilty of negligence per se and that Jose
and Sherry had been twenty-five percent negligent.18' Based on these
findings, the jury awarded $250,000 to Sherry's estate and $250,000 to
Jose. 82 Although the Trust moved for a new trial and for remittitur of
the award, Circuit Judge Gale entered final judgment in accordance
with the verdict.18 3 The Trust then took an appeal and the Newtons
filed a cross-appeal.' 8 ' In a brief opinion written by District Judge Bas-
kin and joined in by District Judges Nesbitt and Cope, the judgment
was affirmed in part and reversed in part. 8 5
Judge Baskin began her review by agreeing with the Trust that the
damages won by Sherry's estate were excessive. She therefore reversed
dissenting)).
176. Id. at 351, 1991 AMC at 1400.
177. 575 So. 2d 216 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
178. Id. at 217.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Perlman, 575 So. 2d at 217.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 218.
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the jury's award and remanded for remittitur or a new trial.186 With
respect to Jose's recovery, however, Judge Baskin decided that it was
supported by the evidence and therefore refused to disturb it.'87
Having disposed of the appeal, Judge Baskin turned to the cross-
appeal. Here she found that Judge Gale had been correct in dismissing
the Newtons' claim because they had not relied on their daughter for
financial support. Recognizing that the question was controlled by a
very recent decision of the United States Supreme Court, Judge Baskin
wrote: "The trial court properly granted summary judgment in the
Trust's favor as the parents may not recover under general maritime
law absent a showing of financial dependence on the decedent."' 88
The final passenger case of the survey period was Wilkinson v.
Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc.. " Marjetta Wilkinson and Tracie Sanders
had been travelling companions aboard the S/S TROPICALE, a cruise
ship owned by Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. (Carnival). 190 On the after-
noon of September 30, 1983, after sunning herself for a short time by
the pool on the Lido Deck, Wilkinson walked barefoot towards an elec-
tronic sliding glass door on the ship's port side."' As she walked
through the door, it closed, running over the toes of her right foot. 19
Wilkinson filed suit against Carnival claiming that it had failed to
maintain the door properly and also had failed to warn her that the
door could close suddenly. 93 The case was assigned to District Judge
Zloch and the parties proceeded to discovery. 94 As the date for trial
neared, Carnival made a motion for summary judgment.'95 Although
the magistrate to whom the motion was referred recommended that it
be granted, Judge Zloch ruled that while the plaintiff's case was weak,
there was sufficient evidence to warrant a trial.' 96
186. Id. at 217-18.
187. Perlman, 575 So. 2d at 218.
188. Id. (citing Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 111 S. Ct. 317, 1991 AMC 1
(1990)). The Supreme Court's decision is commented on in Ross Diamond III, Wrong-
ful Death Remedies After Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 3 MAR. L. REP. 49 (1991), and
C. Taylor Simpson, Note, Sailing the Statutory Seas Toward Uniformity in Maritime
Tort Law: Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 15 TUL. MAR. L.J. 449 (1991).
189. 920 F.2d 1560 (11th Cir. 1991).
190. Id. at 1562.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Wilkinson, 920 F.2d at 1562.
195. /d.
196. Id. at 1563.
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Much of the trial centered around the testimony of Sanders. She
had not witnessed the accident, but claimed to have had a conversation
with a cabin steward named Fletcher shortly after the accident. Ac-
cording to Sanders, Fletcher had told her that he had been aware of
the door's propensity to malfunction and had been trying to fix it. 97
Carnival objected to the introduction of his testimony on the ground
that it was inadmissible hearsay. 98 Wilkinson responded by arguing
that it should be let in as a party admission.1 99 After considering the
matter, Judge Zloch concluded that the statement was admissible as a
statement by a party's servant concerning a matter within the scope of
his employment.2"'
The trial also focused on the testimony of several other witnesses
who claimed that after Wilkinson's accident the door that had injured
her was locked in an open position for the remainder of the cruise.21
Initially, Judge Zloch ruled that this testimony was inadmissible be-
cause it constituted evidence of a subsequent remedial measure.20 2 On
the next day of the trial, however, Judge Zloch held that the testimony
was admissible to impeach Rafael Marcialis, the ship's second officer,
who had testified that when he inspected the door he had found it to be
in "normal operating condition." 03
Following the trial the jury returned a verdict in favor of Wilkin-
son and awarded her $260,000, less twenty percent for her negli-
gence.20' After Carnival's motions for a judgment notwithstanding the
verdict, remittitur, and a new trial were denied, Carnival filed an ap-
peal.20 5 On appeal, the judgment was reversed and the case was re-
manded for a new trial in an opinion written by Circuit Judge Fay and
joined in by Circuit Judge Edmondson and Senior Circuit Judge
Tuttle.20 6
Judge Fay turned first to the question of whether Fletcher's al-
leged statement should have been admitted. Noting that neither party
197. Id. at 1562-63.
198. Id. at 1563.
199. Wilkinson, 920 F.2d at 1563.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 1563-64.
203. Id. at 1564.
204. Wilkinson, 920 F.2d at 1564.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 1562.
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had attempted to depose Fletcher or call him to the stand, °7 Judge Fay
did not question Sanders' contention that Fletcher had told her that the
door had been malfunctioning. Instead, Judge Fay posed the question
as being whether Fletcher was in a position to speak for Carnival about
the door's operation.2 0 8 Relying on an affidavit submitted by Jack
Stein, of Carnival's Operations Department, Judge Fay found that
cabin stewards such as Fletcher were strictly prohibited from being in
any of the ship's "passenger areas. 2 0 9 Since the accident had taken
place in such an area,2 10 Judge Fay concluded that Fletcher's statement
was not a party admission: "The magistrate found, and we agree, that
Stein's affidavit established 'that the statement made by a room stew-
ard to Is. Sanders did not concern a matter within the scope of his
agency or employment,' and therefore was hearsay. "211
Although agreeing with Carnival that as a practical matter the
plaintiff's case was over, Judge Fay noted that there still was a slight
chance that Wilkinson could find a way to get Fletcher's statement into
evidence.212 Since another trial remained a theoretical possibility,
Judge Fay reviewed Wilkinson's impeachment of the ship's second of-
ficer. Once again, he found reversible error. In explaining his conclu-
sion, Judge Fay wrote:
207. Id. at 1562 n.3.
208. Id. at 1565. Judge Fay described the inquiry by writing: "The appropriate
focus is instead upon whether the cabin steward's statement concerned a 'matter within
the scope of [his] agency or employment' with Carnival." Wilkinson, 920 F.2d at 1565.
209. Id. at 1566.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Judge Fay explained the need to remand the case, rather than simply re-
verse, as follows:
If 801(d)(2)(D) were the only avenue through which plaintiff had at-
tempted to offer the Fletcher statements, then we might well simply re-
verse and enter judgment for Carnival on this issue. Our examination of
the record, however, reveals that following the magistrate's recommenda-
tion . . . plaintiff filed a Notice of Intent to Rely on Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 803(24) . ...
Because the district court overruled the magistrate's report and ad-
mitted the Fletcher statements as non-hearsay admissions of a party-oppo-
nent under Rule 801(d)(2)(D), it never considered the applicability of
Rule 803(24), the so-called "Catchall" exception to the hearsay rule . . ..
Accordingly, we leave it to the district court to determine whether the
cabin steward's hearsay statements comport sufficiently with the criteria of
Rule 803(24) to justify admission under that exception.
Id. at 1567 n.13.
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Marcialis made no statements concerning the functioning of the
door in the days subsequent to September 30. He did not assert
that the Tropicale's crew or the cruise line had exercised "all rea-
sonable care" in maintaining the door. Nor did he make represen-
tations that the door in question was in the "safest" or the "best"
condition.
In short, the evidence of the subsequent remedial measure in this
case impeached nothing in Marcialis' testimony. Moreover, admit-
ting various witnesses' testimony to the fact of the doors being kept
open likely gave rise to the precise inference of negligence that
Rule 407 was designed to avoid. Accordingly, the evidence should
have remained inadmissible.21
C. Seamen
Two very unusual personal injury cases involving seamen were de-
cided during the time covered by the survey. In Tanker Management,
Inc. v. Brunson,21" Darrel Allen, a merchant seaman, suffered a back
injury in September, 1983 while working aboard the M/V CAROLE
G. INGRAM. 21' Allen was treated by Dr. Bruce C. Brunson, who
signed a certificate in February, 1984 stating that Allen could return to
work in three weeks provided that he did not have to lift anything ex-
ceeding fifty pounds.216 In December, 1984, Brunson signed a second
certificate stating that Allen could resume work in two weeks with no
weight restriction.1 In August, 1985, Allen suffered a second back
injury while working aboard the CAROLE G. INGRAM. 1
Allen subsequently sued Tanker Management, Inc., the operator
of the CAROLE G. INGRAM, for both injuries. In time, Tanker
213. Wilkinson, 920 F.2d at 1568-69. Having dealt with the evidentiary ques-
tions posed by the appeal and having found that a new trial was necessary, Judge Fay
ended his opinion by disposing of the final issue in short order. Carnival had argued
that Judge Zloch had erred in failing to give one of its requested jury instructions. The
instruction would have informed the jury that it could find that Wilkinson was a hyper-
sensitive victim. Id. at 1569. Judge Fay ruled that the refusal had not been error be-
cause the instruction was covered by another instruction that was given and because
Carnival had been allowed to argue in its closing statement to the jury that Wilkinson's
injuries had been aggravated by a pre-existing condition. Id. at 1570.
214. 918 F.2d 1524 (11th Cir. 1990).
215. Id. at 1525.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id.
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Management settled Allen's lawsuit for $150,000.219 Its counsel then
wrote to Brunson and demanded indemnity for the amounts it had paid
in defending and settling the lawsuit.2"' When Brunson refused to pay,
Tanker Management filed suit against him. According to the com-
plaint, Brunson, who had been paid by Tanker Management to treat
Allen, had intentionally misrepresented Allen's condition (at Allen's
behest) despite knowing that Tanker Management was relying on
Brunson to advise them on whether Allen could return to work.22 1
The case was assigned to District Judge Sharp and a bench trial
was held.. At the close of Tanker Management's case-in-chief Brunson
moved for a directed verdict. Finding that Tanker Management had
failed to make out a prima facie case, Judge Sharp granted the mo-
tion. 22 2 Because Tanker Management had rejected an offer of judgment
from Brunson prior to the start of the trial, Judge Sharp also granted
Brunson's subsequent motion for costs and attorneys' fees.22 3 Tanker
Management then filed an appeal. 2 4
In a rather scholarly opinion, Circuit Judge Clark, joined by Cir-
cuit Judge Hatchett and Senior Circuit Judge Morgan, affirmed Judge
Sharp in all respects.221 5 Finding that Tanker Management's case had
bordered on the frivolous,226 Judge Clark approved the granting of the
directed verdict,22 7 the imposition of costs, 228 and the awarding of at-
torneys' fees,"' as well as Judge Sharp's decision to add The London
Steam-Ship Owner's Mutual Insurance Association Limited, Tanker
Management's insurer, to the judgment so as to make it clear that it
could not relitigate the matter by bringing a new suit in its own
name.
230
The other seaman's suit was Gleneagle Ship Management Co. v.
219. Tanker Management, 918 F.2d at 1525.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 1525-26.
222. Id. at 1526.
223. Id.
224. Tanker Management, 918 F.2d at 1526.
225. Id. at 1529.
226. Id. at 1527. Judge Clark observed dryly: "Appellant failed to present any
evidence which supports the inference that Brunson failed to accurately state his opin-
ion as to Allen's condition." Id.
227. Id. at 1526-27.
228. Tanker Management, 918 F.2d at 1527.
229. Id. at 1527-29.
230. Id. at 1529.
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Leondakos.2" Anthony Leondakos had injured himself when he fell off
a stairwell on the M/V BRIDGETON while sailing in the Persian
Gulf.23 2 He and his wife Carol filed a Jones Act suit " 3 in state court
against Gleneagle Ship Management Company (Gleneagle) and Chesa-
peake Shipping, Inc.234 In response, Gleneagle moved to dismiss the
complaint on the ground that the trial court lacked personal
jurisdiction. 3
Before the motion to dismiss could be heard, Leondakos served a
discovery request aimed at determining whether the trial court did have
jurisdiction. When Circuit Judge Farnell ruled that Leondakos could
engage in limited discovery for the purpose of determining whether ju-
risdiction existed,23 6 Gleneagle filed a writ of certiorari. 23 7
In a short per curiam decision, Acting Chief Judge Ryder and Dis-
trict Judges Danahy and Parker denied the petition. 23 8 After reviewing
both federal and state case law on the issue and noting that a conflict
existed between the two, the panel concluded that the discovery was
appropriate: "We believe the federal rule represents the better ap-
proach to the question, and hold that 'jurisdictional discovery' is availa-
ble during the pendency of jurisdictional issues, subject of course to the
supervision of the trial court. 239
VI. PILOTS
The survey period produced two cases involving pilots. In both, ad-
231. 581 So. 2d 222 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
232. Id. at 223.
233. 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1988). The Jones Act, passed in 1920, reversed traditional
maritime law by giving seaman the right to sue their employers for negligence, See
William B. Milliken et al., Personal Injury and Wrongful Death in FLA. B., MAR. L. &
PRAC. § 2.21, at 38 (1987).
234. Gleneagle, 581 So. 2d at 223.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Gleneagle, 581 So. 2d at 223. In so holding, the panel explicitly rejected the
contrary holding in F. Hoffmann LaRoche & Co. v. Felix, 512 So. 2d 997 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1987), by writing: "Notably, that panel expressed a preference for the
policy followed in the federal judicial system . . . .The panel apparently considered
itself bound by a previous decision of the same court, Far Out Music, Inc. v. Jordan,
438 So. 2d 912 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1983), and lacked support for revisiting that
decision en banc." Id.
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miralty issues took a back seat to administrative law issues as the
courts grappled with the Board of Pilot Commissioners (BPC)24
In Rabren v. Department of Professional Regulation,241 the BPC,
through the Department of Professional Regulation (DPR), had
brought professional misconduct charges against a state-licensed pilot
named David E. Rabren. According to the DPR's administrative com-
plaint, Rabren, as President of the Tampa Tri-County Pilots Associa-
tion (TRICO), had on several occasions in 1986 violated a BPC rule
that required state-licensed pilots to be used in vessel shiftings. 242 In
particular, Rabren was accused of having assigned Gary Murphy, a
TRICO pilot who held only a federal license, to shift the vessels M/V
OCEAN LORD, M/V VOMAR, and M/V ASPEN.2 43
Rabren contested the charges and requested a formal hearing,
which was held in January, 1988.2 " At the hearing, Rabren admitted
that the shifts involving the OCEAN LORD and the VOMAR had
taken place. 45 He contended, however, that no penalty was warranted
because: 1) it was his wife, TRICO's business manager, who had given
the assignments to Murphy, and, 2) the shifts had taken place at
anchorages, not ports, and therefore were not covered by the BPC's
rule."
The hearing officer rejected Rabren's first argument on the ground
that it was not supported by any evidence. 47 With respect to his second
defense, however, the hearing officer agreed with Rabren. He found
that:
Gadsden Anchorage, C.F. Industries, Rockport and Big Bend are
all located in the port of Tampa. Accordingly, vessels moving be-
tween these locations are not entering and leaving port, and under
the specific provisions of [Florida Statutes] Section 310.141 do not
require the presence of a licensed state pilot, or a deputy pilot, on
240. For a general discussion of the powers of pilot commissioners, see A. PARKS,
THE LAW OF TUG, Tow, AND PILOTAGE 1086-99 (2d ed. 1982).
241. 568 So. 2d 1283 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
242. Id. at 1286. This was not Rabren's first run-in with the BPC over this issue.
In 1984, Rabren had challenged an earlier BPC rule concerning vessel shiftings. For a
detailed account, see James I. Crowley, In the Wake of the Exxon Valdez: Charting
the Course of Pilotage Regulation, 22 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 165, 187-89 (1991).
243. Rabren, 568 So. 2d at 1286.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id.
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board during maneuvers .... .
Based on his finding that Murphy's shiftings were at places that were
not ports, the hearing officer recommended that the charges against
Rabren be dismissed. 49
Several months later, in May, 1988, the BPC adopted the hearing
officer's recommendation in a final order.25 0 The order, however, con-
tained one very important change. Whereas the hearing officer had
found that the anchorages at which Murphy had worked were outside
the statutory definition of ports, the BPC included in its order the fol-
lowing conclusion of law: "In addition to the above Conclusions
adopted from those of the Hearing Officer, the Board concludes that
Gadsden Anchorage, C.F. Industries, Rockport and Big Bend are ports
within the meaning of Section 310.002(4), Florida Statutes." '251 Upon
receiving the BPC's order, Rabren filed a challenge to it in court.252 In
a well-written opinion that demonstrated a mastery over extremely
complicated facts, District Judge Miner, joined by District Judges
Nimmons and Barfield, agreed with Rabren and struck down the con-
clusion that the four facilities were ports. 53
Judge Miner began his opinion by first finding that Rabren had
standing to challenge the BPC's ruling even though the ruling had
adopted the hearing officer's recommendation that the charges against
Rabren should be dropped. Finding that new charges already had been
brought against Rabren based on the order's redesignation of the
anchorages as ports, Judge Miner concluded that Rabren ought to be*
allowed to challenge the order:
In terms of standing, we acknowledge that this is close to the
boundary which separates injury in fact from mere illusory specu-
lation . . . . However, the fact that there are pending charges
against appellant based upon the legal conclusion contained in the
final order serves to distinguish this case . . . . While standing
here is not overwhelmingly clear, we hold that appellant has
standing. 2
54
248. Rabren, 568 So. 2d at 1287.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 1287-88.
253. Rabren, 568 So. 2d at 1290.
254. Id. at 1288.
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Having resolved the standing issue, Judge Miner turned to the real
question: had the BPC overstepped its boundaries by deciding that the
anchorages should be considered ports? In doing so, he confronted the
always hazy distinction between agency rulemaking and agency adjudi-
cation. The difference between the two in Florida has been described
by one noted commentator as follows:
Generally, agencies can create legally binding policy by either us-
ing their rule making authority or by properly developing policy
positions in adjudicatory proceedings. The latter have been labeled
incipient rules by the courts, because they are developed in the case
by case adjudicative process through a series of orders. There are
several critical distinctions between the two processes. One such
distinction is the type of record required to support agency policy
developed in an adjudicatory proceeding . . . . [In order to with-
stand judicial challenge, the agency] must support in the record
with competent substantial evidence every factual conclusion that
is necessary to justify the agency's policy choice and detail the le-
gal rationale for such policy choices.a55
Although faced with a difficult question, Judge Miner found the
answer rather easy. After considering the proceedings undertaken by
the BPC and the DPR, he concluded that the record did not contain
nearly enough evidence to support the BPC's redesignations. He ex-
plained his conclusion by writing:
In the instant case, there is no record foundation for the BPC's
conclusion that CFI, Gadsden Anchorage, Rockport and Big Bend
are ports. The transcript of the DOAH proceeding was not availa-
ble, and the factual findings adopted in the BPC's final order tend
to support a contrary conclusion. Neither does the order offer an
explanation or justification for the policy. The BPC simply states in
conclusory fashion that the facilities are ports. We find this conclu-
sion to be unsupported by the record.2B5
255. Johnny C. Burris, Administrative Law, 14 NOVA L. REV. 583, 613-14
(1990) (emphasis in original).
256. Rabren, 568 So. 2d at 1289. Although it had no bearing on the case, by the
time Judge Miner's decision was published the statute under which the BPC had pro-
ceeded had been amended. See FLA. STAT. § 310.141 (1990). The amendment, which
will expire on October 1, 1996 unless reenacted, exempts vessel dockings, undockings,
and shiftings from the rule requiring the use of a state-licensed pilot.
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The other pilotage case of the survey period was McDonald v. De-
partment of Professional Regulation.25 7 George H. McDonald, a li-
censed harbor pilot, was fined $500 by the BPC and DPR for allowing
the stern of the M/V KALLIOPE II, a vessel he was piloting with the
assistance of the tugboats TAMPA and ORANGE out to Tampa Bay,
to be towed into the west bank of the Cut D channel.2 58 Following the
imposition of the fine, McDonald appealed the order.25"
On appeal, a divided panel consisting of District Judges Ervin and
Zehmer and Senior District Judge Wentworth produced three separate
opinions. Judge Ervin wrote the majority opinion, in which Judge
Zehmer joined by penning a special concurrence. Judge Wentworth ob-
jected to both the majority opinion and the concurrence in a short
dissent.
Each member of the panel agreed that the issue before the court
was whether the BPC had met its burden of proving that McDonald
had been negligent. In finding negligence, the hearing officer had relied
on an evidentiary presumption borrowed from a federal admiralty case:
in the absence of severe weather conditions or mechanical difficulties,
evidence that a vessel has been navigated outside the channel is prima
facie evidence of negligence. 6" The BPC accepted the hearing officer's
recommendation that McDonald be found negligent, but modified the
presumption to include, in addition to weather conditions and mechani-
cal difficulties, "the absence of any exigent circumstances." '261
In reviewing the BPC's decision, Judge Ervin believed that both
the BPC and the hearing officer had been wrong to rely on the pre-
sumption. He therefore reversed the decision and remanded the case
for further proceedings in which the presumption could not be used.2 2
In setting out the rationale behind his ruling, Judge Ervin wrote:
Under the principle of strict construction applicable to disciplinary
statutes and the principles set forth in the cases cited above, it fol-
lows that without any provision for a legal presumption in the disci-
plinary statutes, the agency lacks authority to adopt a legal pre-
257. 582 So. 2d 660 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
258. Id. at 661-62.
259. Id. at 662.
260. Id. The case from which the hearing officer and the BPC had borrowed the
presumption was Woods v. United States Department of Transportation, 681 F.2d 988,
1985 AMC 2112 (5th Cir. 1982).
261. McDonald, 582 So. 2d at 662.
262. Id. at 664.
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sumption that effectively relieves it from having to prove specific
acts of misconduct and shifts the burden of proving innocence to
the licensee. We have found no such statutory provision authorizing
DPR or the Board to adopt or apply any presumption like that
applied in this case. Thus, DPR, in urging the Board to adopt the
presumption, and the Board, in applying the presumption to sup-
port the finding of guilt, greatly exceeded their statutorily dele-
gated authority under Florida law.2 68
Although he agreed with Judge Ervin that reliance on the pre-
sumption had been error, Judge Zehmer in his concurrence explained
that he believed that the case against McDonald was so weak that the
order should have been reversed with directions to dismiss the
charges.164
The panel's final opinion, by Judge Wentworth, came to an en-
tirely opposite conclusion. Judge Wentworth concluded that the BPC
had been correct to use the presumption and also had been correct in
finding 'that McDonald had been negligent. 265 Since the presumption
was not a "conclusive" presumption, Judge Wentworth saw no reason
that would bar its use and chastised Judge Ervin for making the BPC's
job more difficult by prohibiting "the use of rebuttable evidentiary de-
vices which are well rooted in the law of the subject matter
regulated."266
VII. PRODUCTS LIABILITY
In recent years, the number of marine products liability suits has
been rapidly increasing. The period under study produced two such
cases, both of which turned out to be victories for the manufacturers
and distributors of products that fail.
In Ruano v. Water Sports of America, Inc.,267 Nelson Atan, a
fourteen year old, and his brother rented a jet ski known as a "wave
jammer" from the defendant, Water Sports of America (WSA)"
263. Id.
264. See id. at 1593.
265. Id. at 676.
266. McDonald, 582 So. 2d at 676.
267. 578 So. 2d 385 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
268. Id. at 385. Unlike other types of jet skis, a wave jammer is driven with the
operator standing. Id. The Eleventh Circuit has found that jet skis are vessels for fed-
eral admiralty purposes. See Keys Jet Ski, Inc. v. Kays, 893 F.2d 1225, 1990 AMC
609 (11th Cir. 1990). For a discussion of Keys, see Jeffrey S. Winder, Note, On the
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Before being allowed to take out the jet ski, the boys were given operat-
ing instructions, provided with rudimentary safety precautions, and told
to stay away from the swimming area.269
David Ruano, a swimmer, was sitting in Biscayne Bay near the
Rickenbacker Causeway approximately five to eight feet from the
shore.270 The area in which he was sitting was part of the established
swimming area.27' In an instant, he was hit in the head by the wave
jammer, knocked unconscious for a few seconds, and sustained injuries
to his ear and to other parts of his body. 72
Following the June, 1988 mishap, Ruano brought suit against
WSA for having negligently entrusted the wave jammer to a minor.
Circuit Judge Turner granted a motion for summary judgment by
WSA and Ruano appealed. 3 In a short opinion, District Judge
Barkdull, joined by District Judges Nesbitt and Jorgenson, affirmed the
decision.27'
WSA had moved for summary judgment on the ground that under
Florida law liveries cannot be held liable for negligent entrustment.
Judge Turner had agreed with WSA, and so did Judge Barkdull. Find-
ing that WSA has complied fully with the law, he wrote:
The trial court properly entered summary judgment because sec-
tion 327.54, Florida Statutes (1987), provides a complete defense,
thus relieving the defendant from liability. The statute provides
that the liability of a commercial lessor ceases upon compliance
with the statutory safety requirements. The statute supplants the
common law theories of vicarious liability and negligent entrust-
ment. Moreover, even if the statute does not constitute a defense
for negligent entrustment, there is no view of the facts which sup-
ports such a claim. 76
A more traditional products liability claim was made in American
Universal Insurance Group v. General Motors Corporation.7 6 In 1985,
Duty to Follow Precedent in Applying the Limitation of Liability Act: Keys Jet Ski,
Inc. v. Kays, 15 TUL. MAR. L.J. 465 (1991).
269. Ruano, 578 So. 2d at 385.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 386.
274. Ruano, 578 So. 2d at 386.
275. Id.
276. 578 So. 2d 451 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
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Robert Cook purchased from Diesel Parts, Sales & Service, Inc. (Die-
sel Parts) a replacement oil pump that had been manufactured and
distributed by the defendant, General Motors Corporation (GMC).2
Diesel Parts subsequently installed the pump aboard Cook's fishing
boat, the F/V CAPTAIN SLEEPY. 78 Two years later, on January 20,
1987, the pump's drive gear failed and burned up the CAPTAIN
SLEEPY's engine while she was being operated off the coast of New
Symrna Beach. 79
Pursuant to its insurance policy, the plaintiff, American Universal
Insurance Group (American), paid Cook and his wife $7,392.91.280
Meanwhile, Cook returned the engine to Diesel Parts, and they re-
paired it. When Cook failed to pay for the repairs, Diesel Parts sued
him. In response, Cook claimed a set-off based upon Diesel Parts' al-
leged breach of its implied warranty of merchantability arising out of
the original sale.18 1 Cook also brought a third-party complaint against
Diesel Parts and GMC.182 American, having become subrogated to
Cook on account of its payment to him, then filed an intervening com-
plaint against both Diesel Parts and GMC.288
The case was assigned to Circuit Judge Beverly. She eventually
dismissed American's complaint against GMC and also dismissed the
negligence count in American's complaint against Diesel Parts. 4 In
response, American filed an appeal with respect to the dismissal of
GMC.280 In a well-crafted opinion, District Judge Smith, joined by
District Judge Booth, affirmed the dismissal.28 6 Although District
Judge Zehmer dissented, he did not write an opinion. 7
After a careful review of the case law, Judge Smith stated what
has become the accepted rule in this state: "Florida law does not per-
mit a buyer under a contract for goods to recover economic losses in
tort without a claim for personal injury or property damage to property
277. Id. at 451.
278. Id.
279. Id. at 451-52.
280. Id. at 452.
281. American Universal, 578 So. 2d at 452.
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. American Universal, 578 So. 2d at 455.
287. Id.
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other than the allegedly defective goods. 12 88 Having set out the rule,
Judge Smith turned to American's argument for why the rule did not
apply.
According to American, the oil pump had been the product that
Cook had purchased and the engine was the "other property" that the
product had damaged when it malfunctioned.289 Although the distinc-
tion drawn by American sounded reasonable enough, Judge Smith
found that it did not comport with the facts of the case:
Here the object of the bargain was a repaired engine, not just a
replacement oil pump. The oil pump furnished essential lubrication
and heat protection to the engine-this is the part of the "bargain"
purchased, not just the metal and parts making up the oil pump.
The pump became an integral part of the repaired engine and
when it damaged itself, and the engine parts, this was not damage
to "other property. 2
90
VIII. SALVAGE
There was only one salvage case during the survey period, but it
proved to be a dandy. In Flagship Marine Services, Inc. v. Belcher
Towing Co.,2 91 the tugboat E.N. BELCHER, JR., and her two barges
became stranded on the morning of July 17, 1989, after striking an
unidentified submerged object near Big Shell Island off the Southwest
Florida coast. Realizing that he was in trouble, William Diamond, the
BELCHER's captain, notified the Coast Guard and then began trying
to save his ship. 292 The Coast Guard relayed Diamond's message to the
Ft. Myers Fire Department, the Cape Coral Fire and Police Depart-
ments, and Flagship Marine Services, Inc., a private salvage company
operating under the name Sea Tow Services of Lee County (Sea
Tow).293 Within the hour, help began arriving.2 94
288. Id. at 453 (citing Florida Power & Light Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.,
510 So. 2d 899 (Fla. 1987)). As Judge Smith noted, this is the same standard as the
one used in federal admiralty proceedings. Id. (citing East River Steamship Corp. v.
Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 1986 AMC 2027 (1986)); see also Sympo-
sium, Products Liability in Admiralty, 62 TUL. L. REv. 313 (1988).
289. American Universal, 578 So. 2d at 455.
290. Id. at 454.
291. 761 F. Supp. 792 (S.D. Fla. 1991).
292. Id. at 793.
293. Id.
[Vol. 16
38
Nova Law Review, Vol. 16, Iss. 1 [1991], Art. 4
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol16/iss1/4
Jarvis
When the first of three Sea Tow ships appeared on the scene, Dia-
mond asked the Sea Tow representative how much his company would
charge. Although a discussion ensued, no price was agreed on and Sea
Tow eventually went to Work with the issue left open.2 * After four
difficult hours, during which a diver was deployed to patch a hole in the
BELCHER's hull, Sea Tow managed to save both the BELCHER and
the barges.296
After the rescue, one of Sea Tow's fleet captains, a Captain
Robinson, prepared but then did not send an invoice for $24,281 .2
Instead, Sea Tow filed a suit for salvage against Belcher Towing Com-
pany, Belcher Oil Co., the BELCHER, and the two barges. Following
a four day bench trial in March and April, 1991, Judge Aronovitz
found that Sea Tow was entitled to a salvage award. Although Captain
Robinson's invoice had been found by Belcher in discovery and had
been introduced, Judge Aronovitz decided that it was not important:
"The invoice represents a calculation of what the salvage job would
have cost had it been on a straight time and materials basis. It does not
account for all of the elements of a salvage award."" 8 Judge Aronovitz
also found that the conversation between Diamond and the Sea Tow
representative did not bar Sea Tow's ability to claim salvage: "Further-
more, the conversations that took place between Sea Tow and Captain
Diamond did not rise to the level of either a contract between the par-
ties, or a special oral agreement."2 99
Having concluded that Sea Tow was entitled to claim salvage,
Judge Aronovitz then considered the size of the award. Noting that the
BELCHER and her barges were worth $670,000 and that the equip-
ment that had been used by Sea Tow (and therefore put at risk) was
valued at $250,000, Judge Aronovitz decided that an award of
$125,000 would be "fair recompense."0'
294. Id. at 794.
295. Id.
296. Flagship, 761 F. Supp. at 794-95.
297. Id. at 796.
298. Id.
299. Id. (citing Brown v. Johnson, 881 F.2d 107 (4th Cir. 1989)).
300. Id. at 796-97. In so holding, Judge Aronovitz did not explain how he had
reached the figure of $125,000.00 or why such an amount was fair. This is not surpris-
ing, however, for rarely is there any logical explanation for the size of a salvage award.
As has been noted elsewhere: "Eventually the trial judge will pull an arbitrary figure
out of the air." GRANT GILMORE & CHARLES L. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY § 8-
10, at 56 (2d ed. 1975). For a very interesting article that decries the current system
1991]
39
Jarvis: Admiralty
Published by NSUWorks, 1991
Nova Law Review
IX. CONCLUSION
As noted in the Introduction, this survey period contained an ec-
lectic mix of the traditional as well as the unusual. Each of the cases
are great reading, and all serve to illustrate the period's single most
important lesson: to be successful in the highly specialized practice of
admiralty law, it helps to be an accomplished generalist. 01
and attempts to provide a mathematical formula for computing salvage awards, see
Note, Calculating and Allocating Salvage Liability, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1896 (1986).
301. The credit for this observation belongs to Mary C. Hubbard, Esq., a mari-
time lawyer with the New Orleans law firm of Phelps Dunbar, who related it to the
author during the Southeastern Admiralty Law Institute's 1991 Annual Continuing
Legal Education Seminar in Savannah, Georgia.
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